Bangladesh’s new government under the Rahman-led Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) has notably softened the anti-India rhetoric that characterized the previous administration under Muhammad Yunus. The past 18 months marked one of the most challenging periods in India–Bangladesh relations. However, the long-standing naval training cooperation under the ITEC framework quietly helped prevent the relationship from collapsing completely.
The continuation of joint naval activities offers a revealing contrast to the shifting political narrative. Despite the deterioration of ties following Bangladesh’s change in government in 2024, the two nations proceeded with the fifth Bongosagar exercise in 2025 and the sixth edition of the Coordinated Patrol (CORPAT) in the Bay of Bengal. Amid stalled ministerial exchanges and increasing anti-India sentiment in Dhaka, Indian and Bangladeshi warships conducted complex maritime drills, demonstrating how naval cooperation—particularly training linkages—has remained a resilient pillar of the relationship.
This enduring cooperation is no coincidence; it stems from years of naval training led by India, most prominently through the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) programme. Between FY 2016–17 and 2024–25, the Bangladesh Navy sent 419 personnel to train in India. During the politically tense 2024–25 period, 34 Bangladeshi naval officers participated in courses covering navigation, engineering, hydrography, communication, and maritime law enforcement. These training ties have built deep personal and institutional bonds, which remain unaffected by political shifts.
The continuity of maritime cooperation is all the more significant considering the strain in diplomatic relations. Land-based military engagements have stalled, with the 11th edition of Exercise SAMPRITI in October 2023 being the last. In May 2025, Dhaka canceled a $21-million defence contract with Garden Reach Shipbuilders & Engineers for an 800-tonne ocean-going tug project under India’s $500-million defence line of credit to Bangladesh. However, Bongosagar and CORPAT proceeded in 2025, despite the dip in diplomatic relations. INS Ranvir of the Indian Navy and BNS Abu Ubaidah of the Bangladesh Navy met in designated areas along the maritime boundary, carrying out manoeuvres, communication drills, VBSS cross-boardings, and coordinated tactical operations. The training pipeline ensured that both navies not only trusted each other but were also structurally prepared to work together.
For many Indian Ocean littoral states—Sri Lanka, Mauritius, Myanmar, and the Maldives—India remains the primary provider of naval training. Officers trained in Indian institutions gain doctrinal familiarity, procedural fluency, and professional confidence, making bilateral naval activities smoother and more predictable.
These training ties go beyond operational convenience; they directly contribute to India’s broader strategic posture in the Indian Ocean Region. As major powers, including China, increase their influence in the Bay of Bengal and Indian Ocean Region, India’s training programmes provide neighbouring navies with a consistent, high-quality, long-term partnership. Unlike hardware sales, which can be politically influenced, training investments in people are more durable and difficult to reverse. It shapes officers, sailors, and specialists who learn to plan and operate alongside India, fostering alignment that is gradual, enduring, and less susceptible to political fluctuations.
This approach aligns with India’s SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region) vision, which focuses on collective security, regional capacity-building, and cooperative maritime governance. By enhancing the capacity of its neighbours’ navies, India helps create a maritime environment that is orderly, predictable, and resilient to destabilizing external influences.
The Bangladesh example highlights the effectiveness of this approach. Even when political relations are strained, naval cooperation continues, underpinned by years of steady engagement through programmes like ITEC. This training has fostered professional familiarity, enabling officers on both sides to work from shared practices and experiences, even during politically turbulent times. Consequently, India’s maritime diplomacy is not solely reliant on the ebb and flow of domestic politics in neighbouring countries. It is built on a foundation of training, interoperability, and common maritime interests—key elements that endure, even amid periods of political uncertainty.
