Shakeela wani
The security situation in the Kashmir valley, particularly in the Shumali (Northern) region of the valley, is arguably better than it has been. Once a hotbed of terrorism, North Kashmir is now witnessing peace and stability in recent years. If we take the case of Trehgam itself, it is the first time in 38 years that Trehgam was opened on Maqbool Bhat’s Death Anniversary. Every index of terrorist violence, including net infiltration attempts across the borders, grenade attacks, suicide attacks and stone pelting have witnessed a steep fall, especially in the North Kashmir region.
However, while the North Kashmir is relatively calm, South Kashmir has continued to witness terrorist-initiated incidents, in particular target of non-locals and off duty uniformed persons. Even in north Kashmir, although there have been no incidents of violence in the last three years, apprehensions of terrorist supporters, recovery of war-like stores, reports of moving of terrorists, and exhibition of support for Pakistan on certain occasions indicate that there are still undercurrents which if left unchecked may threaten peace at the slightest given opportunity. It is more apt to call the present scenario ‘stable but sensitive’. Nevertheless, the space for terrorists is said to have been curtailed severely, more so in North Kashmir.
The militancy in the initial stages in Kashmir Valley, was fuelled by a separatist ideology with ‘Plebiscite Front’ steering the move. The activities of National Liberation Front, later Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), armed wing of the Plebiscite Front, formed by Amanullah Khan and Maqbool Bhat, was more pronounced in the bordering districts of North Kashmir. The misguided and disillusioned Kashmiri youths were enticed to cross the porous LoC, for arms training in PIOK. Then, they infiltrated back to carry out subversive activities in the hinterland. The villages along the Shamshabari Ridge acted as staging areas for the terrorists and provided all logistic support, either by their own will or by coercion. Most locals were employed as guides, gun runners and informers in the emerging conflict economy. As the Security agencies tried to restrict the entry and dry up the support base, the region bore the brunt of the counter terrorist operations and became the epicentre of violence.
The separatist ideology and the activities of JKLF were not synchronised with the more giant game of Pakistan in J & K. The Plebiscite front and JKLF therefore did not get much support from the ISI. ISI, instead, infiltrated foreign terrorists into Kashmir to give a politico-religious twist to the move and wage “Jihad” under the umbrella of Hizbul Mujahidin and LeT. Pro-Pakistan ideology received centre stage, while the HM terrorists targeted pro-independence ideologists. Very soon, members of JKLF either switched allegiance to HM or were neutralised. The killing of Abdul Ghani Lone, the only tall leader from the north and the founder of Al Badr, a pro-independence group, in 2001 was the tipping point for the people of the north. The cycle of violence had taken a massive toll on the lives of the people and economy of the region. The people therefore wished for peace and were opposed to violence. The sealing of LoC with measures like fencing etc. made infiltration difficult. Due to reduction of support base and difficulties in infiltration, the influx of foreign terrorists gradually reduced and so did the violence in the North.
The overall security situation in Kashmir Valley for the last 5-6 years is better than before. However, while the situation is improving in some districts, the violent incidents have increased in others, which were relatively peaceful earlier. Infiltration across the LoC has come down sharply since 2019. There has been an 84% decline in infiltration attempts since 2019. In 2019, out of 130 infiltration attempts, 87 were successful, while in 2022, out of 21 infiltration attempts, only 08 succeeded. The reduction in infiltration has been attributed to various factors like political crisis in Pakistan, pandemic-induced global eco crisis, grey-listing of Pak by FATF, robust anti infiltration and proactive ops by our Army. While the infiltration figures have significantly reduced, the intelligence agencies have consistently reported on an average of 150 terrorists poised for infiltration from PIOK launch pads. There has thus been no significant change in the number of terrorists in launch pads over the years. The intelligence agencies have also indicated that the terrorists are currently not being actively supported by the Pak Army in their infiltration bids as hitherto fore.
A study of the background of the recruits and interrogation of captured terrorists reveals that radicalisation through social media, glorification of terrorists, unemployment and drug abuse are some of the main reasons leading to recruitment by terrorist groups. The study also reveals that most recruits were from poor backgrounds and were less educated (high school or lower). However, the recent trend shows that even educated youth from well-to-do families are joining terrorist organisations. In 2020, out of the 91 terrorist recruits, about 17% had finished graduation or were qualified engineers, around 25% were graduates, 34% youth recruits were attending/ attended High school and only 24% had not passed high school. An analysis of age of the recruits revels that youth in the age group of 16-25 are the most vulnerable and likely to fall prey to radical ideology. The radicalisation of local youth is emerging as the most critical security challenge in the valley. Religious radicalisation in Kashmir has local, regional and global dimensions. The ideologues believe and preach that to restore the Islam to its pristine form, and save it from further de-generation, it is essential to cleanse the valley of the “non-believers” and wipe out the Sufi cult. It is preached that “Jehad” is the only means by which this can be done.
Terrorist organisations require significant funding for undertaking terrorist accounts and for other activities such as maintaining and functioning the organisation and sponsoring radical ideologies. There are two primary sources of terrorist financing: the international diaspora and the local population. The latter includes co-ethnic, co-religious groups that finance organised crime. The former consists of the Pak State and Pak Kashmiris, who are known to contribute to Kashmiri militant outfits operating on Indian soil. Off late, Narcotics are emerging as an essential source of terror financing and are considered as a new weapon in the ongoing proxy war. In a place like Kashmir, where a complex security situation already exists due to a variety of factors, the linkages between narcotics and terrorism have enhanced challenges manifold for security and law enforcement agencies. The aim of “Narco-terrorism” is not only to fund terrorism in Kashmir with local money through smuggled narcotics but also to hinder the youth by luring them into drug abuse and thus undermine the complete society.
The militancy in Kashmir started as a political problem. The North took the lead in the political conflict, seeking greater autonomy and self-rule. Trehgam, the birth place of Maqbool Bhatt became the rallying point for mobilising the masses. The political agitation soon converted into an armed rebellion. However, the movement was for greater autonomy and self-rule. Cessation to either of the dominions was not the aim. The terrorists mainly operated in the Northern Districts of Kashmir, which were closer to the LC. South Kashmir was not involved in this struggle and more or less remained a quiet bystander then. ISI soon transformed the ideology which was not in synchronisation with Pakistani design by inducting other insurgent groups comprising mostly foreign terrorists in Kashmir, with pro-Pakistan and Islamic jihad ideology. The jostling for operational space between the various groups resulted in internecine killings. As the narrative shifted from independence to cessation to Pakistan and then to holy war for establishment of a caliphate, the focus shifted from North Kashmir to South Kashmir where the religious ideologues had been successful to radicalise most young minds.
Reasons for lasting peace in the North Kashmir, has been the mantra, ‘Peace for development’, which the people in North Kashmir have benefitted from. Education is the sum and substance of a society. It is the essence on which the future of a society is nurtured. To change the effect of false narratives and the alienation it has caused it is essential to provide the impressionable minds with correct facts. There is a visible difference between North and South Kashmir regarding peace, security and stability. After three decades of violence, North Kashmir is experiencing relative peace. Army and civil administration have been victorious to a great extent in weaning the youths away from violence and gun culture by providing various opportunities. Sustained normalcy and peace will allow civil administration to operate in a fear-free environment. The development will set an example for South Kashmir to shun violence and follow the path of peace. This will entail a synchronised approach from all stake holders including the government, civil administration and the local population, earliest implementation of development projects, social welfare schemes and empowerment programs.