NoorKashmir has witnessed many terrorist organisations operating on its soil since the 1990s. All of these organisations had an ideological motivation, manpower to recruit and finances to function. Today LeT/ TRF, HM, TuM, Al Badr, JeM etc continue to spread terror in Kashmir. Of course, the sponsor agency continues to be Pakistan with no change in its intent which is known to all. However, over a period of time, the way these tanzeems are being administered and how terrorists are sustaining themselves in Kashmir has changed significantly due to technology leap over the years. Supply of arms and ammunition and money transactions has become more complex making it extremely difficult to bust the network of Over Ground Workers hired to run the networks. In this entire chain, money is the single most important factor, non-availability of which will choke the machinery making the tanzeems irrelevant. Funding agencies in Pakistan and others those who support the Kashmir cause are continuously providing financial aid to sustain the supply of arms and ammunition/ explosives, keep logistics chain running, paying recruiters, funding the ‘Dark Web’ masters who identify potential recruits, funding fake NGOs, madrasas, training of terrorists/ recruits and those who are running the propaganda warfare. With ISI at the helm, the funding source and coordinators are all in Pakistan and the modules operate in Kashmir. Other NGOs, businesses, individuals worldwide support the cause directly or indirectly. Charities for orphanages may seem legitimate, but are being sometimes diverted for funding terror activities. It is difficult to establish the final usage in such collections. Zakat collection, donations, extortion, money from drug trafficking and many other unauthorised means are being used to sustain the terror networks. The traditional ways of transferring money, movement of counterfeit currency and hard cash etc has declined considerably. Transfer through regular banking system in small amounts which does not cross the threshold of creating an alert, are difficult to identify and track as these appear to be normal routine transactions. Even more difficult are the transactions which do not follow any formal financial regulations and are virtually difficult to detect unless intelligence agencies insert a proxy in the entire chain. Hawala transfers are mainstay of money reaching the individuals in the chain. However, drugs and gold movement create enough money within the valley to sustain the modules and terrorists. Digital transfer of money is taking place through complex layers of financial transactions to evade the source of funding during audit trail. Crypto currencies such as Bitcoin are becoming preferred way of transferring money to end user. Due to negligible laws to prevent illicit use of these currencies, it is getting easier for terrorist organisation to explore this method without any fear of detection. Drug money collected is finally distributed to various OGW modules as per instruction from the handler across. Most of this are in small amounts which goes unnoticed. Money transferred online also is not reaching directly, but may enter India through third country and further reach Kashmir after exchanging hands in several other states leaving a long trail for intelligence agencies to detect irregularity. Terrorists require small amounts for regular sustanance. Handing over things in kind with only small amount of hard cash is generally the preferred way and difficult to detect. The expenditure incurred to satisfy the entire chain is phenomenal. While choking the funding from its source is ideal, it will require international interventions based on mutual and common understanding of the Kashmir issue. What is equally important is to identify the individuals who are in India and especially in Kashmir who are the mediators in the chain involved in the movement of funds. While at the national level we are doing everything to expose the source of such funding, within the UT of J&K we have to synergise our efforts to identify the medium of money transfer, intermediary recipient or agent and end user ie the terrorist or the OGW network sustaining the terrorists. India has strictly enforced laws and regulations to counter illicit transfer of funds and individuals can be booked under Unlawful Activities Prevention Act and Prevention of Money Laundering Act. Financial Intelligence Unit under Ministry of Finance monitors suspected transactions and reports directly to Finance Minister. The Terror Monitoring Group set up in Kashmir in Jun 2019 has got the JKP, CBI, IB, NIA, SIA together with financial monitoring groups like Central Board for Direct Taxes/ Indirect Taxes and Central Economic Intelligence Bureau. Since then many raids have been done by NIA bringing down the financing networks and attached property of all those involved in the terror network. Enforcement Directorate also recently attached property of Shabir Ahmed Shah in Srinagar for terror funding and involvement with LeT. SIA also raided seven residential premises of individuals who are likely to be involved in crypto currency trade and using it for funding terrorism. These are proactive steps by the government and relentless pressure needs to be put with newer and smarter ways to bust these networks. The Home Minister also highlighted the challenge of virtual assets being used by terrorists in the recently concluded ‘No Money for Terror’ Ministerial Conference. He said- “We have a new challenge in the form of Virtual Assets before us. New methods of virtual assets are being used by terrorists for financial transactions. This transformation of terrorism from ‘Dynamite to Metaverse’ and ‘AK-47 to Virtual Assets’ is definitely a matter of concern for the countries of the world. And we all have to work together to formulate a common strategy against it.” The first step to disrupt the terrorist related financial activity is to detect it. Financial institutions have to strictly follow ‘Know Your Customer’ (KYC) guideline as per FATF standards. Also, cross border movement of hard cash or negotiable instruments need to be checked through laid down guidelines for declaration of amount during entry through any port. Stringent laws to regulate use of crypto currency needs to be promulgated on priority. Due to limited strength of these central agencies, the footprint in the valley is minimal. There are many enablers in the chain who are supporting and are not on the radar of these agencies because of their locations spread across the valley. Their modus operandi relies on small transactions as they go unnoticed. Since the security forces has the biggest footprints in the valley even in interior and far flung areas, they are fully aware of local dynamics and can be used to connect the dots. This shall help in bringing down the financial network which will not only collapse the OGW network but also make survival of terrorist difficult forcing them to expose themselves and commit a mistakes. Interaction of JKP and NIA/ SIA with local banks is vital. Banks should provide information of individuals who have repaid loans in lump sum especially in cash or Individuals who have deposited cash in account with no trace of source or not commensurate with his income. Purchase of property in cash or through bank loan and immediate repayment should be brought to the notice of law enforcement agencies. We should invest in technology to monitor blockchains through which bitcoin is being transferred from one person to another without knowledge of centralized service providing organisations. Money coming into local bank account from either outside country or within country whether big or small transaction needs to be monitored till conclusion. Huge transactions take place at Fruit Mandis. It is difficult to keep a check on such transactions as maximum number of dealings is in cash. Making fruit mandi transactions online and mandatory will make such transactions transparent. Finally, it is the moral responsibility of the community to keep a check on society members who are likely to be involved in such activities and should report irregular behavior or actions of individuals to JKP or other Armed forces. Helpline numbers towards this will help intelligence agencies to identify and monitor suspected individuals. We have reached a tipping point where a final blow to all such individuals will uproot and expose the network and create a sense of caution amongst those who still have some orientation towards aiding terror activities.
