China’s surging submarine fleet in its People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) may appear to be a good guarantee for nations hoping to acquire export variants of those boats, but beneath the surface, there is a glaring divide between the cutting-edge platforms China makes for domestic use and those it sells to partners.
While PLAN enjoys fleets bristling with nuclear-powered submarines such as the Type 093 “Shang-class”, and advanced diesel-electric Type 039A “Yuan-class”, which are equipped with modern propulsion, quieter hulls, flank sonar arrays and air-independent propulsion (AIP) systems, the export versions often include “stripped-down” systems.
Open-source and defence analyses have pointed out more than a couple of common characteristics for export models:
– Fewer or downgraded sensors and electronics.
– Older or less sensitive hull materials that make subs noisier or less survivable.
– Downgraded weapons suites, with reduced missile capabilities or fewer torpedo options.
AIP is offered as an option rather than standard, or installed only on request (and often different from the most recent domestic modules).
The Harsh Reality of Export Models
One illustrative case is the S20 export variant, a scaled-down version of the Yuan-class. Its AIP system is not guaranteed but optional. Critical acoustic stealth features are modular and cut by default, undermining combat effectiveness.
Similarly, PLAN’s older Type 035 (Ming-class) subs include improved noise-reduction and sonar systems. But their export cousins (e.g., the Type 035G sold to Bangladesh) lack these upgrades, delivering a façade of capability while underpowered and overpriced.
To make matters a whole lot worse, Bangladesh’s experience with these export Ming-class submarines shows the systemic burden: limited availability, high maintenance costs, long crew training cycles, and base infrastructure mainly devoted to mere upkeep.
Put together, those add a heavy drag on already constrained naval budgets.
Why China Makes Its Export Submarines Difficult
In addition to the technology stripping, export variants of submarines create challenges for recipient navies because of the deliberate complexity of the models. Extended crew training and high upkeep demands erode operational readiness, turning submarines into liabilities more than assets.
By limiting the capabilities of exported systems, China ensures that client states remain dependent on Chinese support, upgrades, and maintenance, which increases long-term influence and leverage. It also rakes in cash as recipient navies have to dial China anytime they need spares or repairs.
Proprietary features withheld from export can also be used as bargaining chips for political or economic concessions.
Exporting subs may buy China diplomatic goodwill or regional influence, but in combat, these submarines are largely paper tigers capable of being detected more easily and outmatched by modern adversaries.
Final Word
China’s domestic undersea platforms are steadily improving, quiet, powerful and lethal but those being sold abroad are glorified funding vehicles, not deterrents. By downgrading export models, China ensures partners get the appearance of naval progress, while real undersea supremacy remains tightly guarded.
These export submarines may be paraded beneath the waves to, but in undersea warfare, they are neither silent nor biting. There are no fangs, only flair for this paper tiger. And flair never wins wars.
(Hailing from Kashmir and based in New Delhi, Mehak Farooq is a journalist specialising in defence and strategic affairs. Her work spans security, geopolitics, veterans’ welfare, foreign policy, and the evolving challenges of national and regional stability.)
