The terror attack in Pahalgam in April 2024 once again exposed the enduring reality of Pakistan’s strategic use of terrorism as an instrument of state policy. The assault, carried out by militants affiliated with Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), resulted in the death of five Indian soldiers and left several injured. It was not an isolated incident, nor was it the product of spontaneous radicalization. Instead, it was a deliberate act rooted in a calculated policy framework, sustained by Pakistan’s military-intelligence establishment. The choice of Pahalgam, a peaceful tourist destination in Kashmir, was designed not only to cause physical damage but to send a symbolic message—one that resonates deeply with theories of asymmetrical warfare and power projection explored in the field of International Relations.
From an IR perspective, the Pakistani approach to terrorism can be understood through the lens of Realism, particularly its structural variant. According to Kenneth Waltz, the international system is anarchic, and states act to ensure survival through maximizing security or power. Lacking the conventional military parity to confront India directly, Pakistan turned to asymmetric tools—chiefly non-state actors—as force multipliers. By using jihadist proxies, Pakistan seeks to impose costs on India without triggering a full-scale war. These actions reflect the logic of offensive realism, articulated by John Mearsheimer, where states are inherently aggressive and seek to dominate their regional spheres to secure their long-term interests.
This logic was first seen clearly during the 1980s, when Pakistan, with Western support, cultivated the mujahideen during the Soviet-Afghan war. Once the Soviets withdrew, the infrastructure of jihad was redirected toward Kashmir and later Afghanistan. Groups like Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Taiba were either formed or adopted as strategic assets. Though these groups claimed ideological motives, their operations followed a clear geopolitical script dictated by the ISI. The Pahalgam attack is the latest in a chain of incidents where these non-state actors are mobilized to achieve strategic aims without overt state engagement, a tactic often theorized as plausible deniability in asymmetric conflict literature.
This strategy aligns with Thomas Schelling’s concept of “the threat that leaves something to chance.” By deploying terrorists who are ideologically motivated and operate in grey zones of attribution, Pakistan increases instability while retaining the ability to deny formal involvement. The ambiguity benefits Islamabad diplomatically, particularly in forums where it seeks to project itself as a responsible state battling extremism, even as it selectively cultivates certain groups. The Pahalgam attack was, in this sense, a threat carefully calibrated to remain under the threshold of open war while achieving political and psychological disruption.
Terrorism, as Pakistan employs it, also embodies the concept of proxy warfare, increasingly studied in contemporary security studies. According to scholars like Daniel Byman, proxy actors allow sponsors to advance interests while minimizing risks. These proxies, however, are not always fully controllable, which introduces a layer of unpredictability. Pakistan’s sponsorship of terror groups follows this model, offering operational freedom to proxies like LeT and Jaish-e-Mohammed in return for strategic leverage, particularly in Kashmir. These organizations function not only as instruments of disruption but also as deterrents, signaling that instability will persist unless political concessions are granted.
Critics of the realist interpretation argue that Constructivist theories, which emphasize identity, ideology, and norms, also provide insights into Pakistan’s behavior. From this perspective, the Pakistani military has constructed a national identity that hinges on opposition to India, reinforced by decades of state-sponsored narratives. The ideological apparatus built through education, media, and religious networks sustains support for jihadist proxies, ensuring that strategic interests are embedded in societal values. The use of religion and nationalism as legitimizing tools ensures a constant pool of recruits and public tolerance for violence deemed necessary for national survival.
While realism explains Pakistan’s motivation in terms of state interest, constructivism helps explain its persistence. These are not merely strategic partnerships; they are ideologically symbiotic relationships. Groups like LeT are not just tools but also partners in a shared worldview shaped by historical grievances, religious narratives, and geopolitical ambitions. The Pahalgam attack, from this vantage, was not just an act of external aggression but also an internal reaffirmation of Pakistan’s identity as a defender of a perceived Islamic cause in Kashmir.
Despite mounting international evidence linking Pakistan to such incidents, the global response has often been muted. Liberal Institutionalism, as theorized by Robert Keohane and others, posits that international institutions and interdependence can shape state behavior. However, the failure of bodies like the United Nations to hold Pakistan accountable highlights the limitations of this theory when confronted by geopolitical interests. China’s shielding of Pakistan in the UN Security Council and America’s past reliance on Pakistan for access to Afghanistan exemplify the power politics that continue to override institutional norms. The FATF’s placement of Pakistan on its grey list was a rare exception, but even that failed to bring about systemic change.
India’s response to the Pahalgam attack and similar provocations has often reflected a deterrence-based doctrine. However, traditional deterrence struggles in the face of non-state actors. As scholars like Andrew Kydd and Barbara Walter have noted, terrorism often operates in spaces where deterrence and compellence are hard to implement, due to the distributed and deniable nature of actors. India’s cross-border strikes after Uri and Balakot were attempts to impose costs directly on Pakistan’s terror infrastructure, signaling a shift toward limited retaliation within the bounds of escalation control. But these responses, while impactful, have not yet dismantled the underlying sponsorship networks.
In the long run, any strategy to counter Pakistan’s use of terror must address the structural enablers that make proxy warfare sustainable. This includes cutting financial channels, confronting ideological propagation, and exerting sustained diplomatic pressure. From the IR standpoint, this also raises normative questions about sovereignty and intervention. When a state uses terrorism as a strategic tool, it forfeits the legitimacy usually accorded to sovereign equality. This challenges traditional Westphalian norms and supports emerging doctrines that justify intervention—or at least isolation—of rogue actors.
The domestic costs of this strategy are also rising for Pakistan itself. Blowback from groups initially supported by the state has led to internal instability, loss of life, and erosion of civic institutions. The Pakistani Taliban, once a strategic depth asset, has turned its guns on its former benefactors. The paradox of state-supported terrorism, as shown in the work of scholars like Martha Crenshaw, is that the very groups cultivated for strategic advantage can eventually undermine the state’s own coherence. Despite this, the strategic culture within Pakistan’s military continues to prioritize the utility of these groups over their long-term risks.
Ultimately, the Pahalgam attack is not merely another chapter in the long history of violence in Kashmir—it is a textbook case of how terrorism can be weaponized under state guidance as a form of international strategy. As long as Pakistan retains its current security doctrine—shaped by strategic insecurity, ideological rigidity, and geopolitical hedging—acts of terrorism like this will persist. International relations theory helps us understand that this is not irrational behavior but strategic behavior rooted in Pakistan’s perception of the international system and its place within it.
The path forward requires clarity and resolve from the global community. States that support terrorism cannot be treated as victims of it. The IR community, and policymakers drawing from it, must confront the reality that Pakistan’s behavior undermines not only regional stability but also international norms that govern state conduct. Terrorism, when embedded in state strategy, becomes more than a security issue—it becomes a systemic threat to the international order. Therefore, Pakistan must be punished—politically, economically, and diplomatically—for its calculated use of terrorism as an instrument of statecraft. The global community must impose tangible costs for such conduct, isolate its enablers, and build collective deterrence against the sponsorship of terror. Only by confronting Pakistan’s strategic complicity head-on can the world hope to discredit and dismantle the machinery of state-backed extremism.
