The concept of good neighbourly relations is fundamental to regional stability, cooperation and peace. However, when it comes to Pakistan, the idea of being a “good neighbour” remains an elusive ideal rather than a tangible reality. Despite sharing historical, cultural and linguistic commonalities with its neighbours, Pakistan has, over decades, maintained a policy posture that often undermines peace, promotes instability and prioritizes conflict over cooperation. Nowhere is this more evident than in its relationship with India, Afghanistan and even Iran where mistrust, border tensions and ideological divergence frequently dominate the narrative.
From its very inception in 1947, Pakistan’s geopolitical outlook was shaped not by the desire for peaceful coexistence but by an identity crisis and a deep-rooted insecurity complex. Created as a homeland for Muslims of the Indian subcontinent, Pakistan was born in conflict with partition leaving behind bloodshed and unresolved issues, the most enduring being the dispute over Jammu and Kashmir. Rather than working towards resolution through diplomacy and mutual dialogue, Pakistan institutionalized hostility. It adopted a state policy where animosity toward India became central to its national identity, public discourse and even educational curricula.
Over time, this ideology found a dangerous expression in Pakistan’s patronage of cross-border terrorism. Rather than developing strong economic and cultural ties with India, Pakistan’s military-intelligence complex supported and funded terrorist groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammad and Hizbul Mujahideen. These groups not only carried out attacks in Jammu and Kashmir but also perpetrated large-scale terrorism on Indian soil, including the 2001 Indian Parliament attack and the horrific 2008 Mumbai attacks. These were not random acts of extremism but calculated moves either supported or tolerated by elements within Pakistan’s security establishment, aimed at bleeding India through a thousand cuts.
India, in contrast, repeatedly attempted to extend the hand of friendship. Successive Indian prime ministers from Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Manmohan Singh to Narendra Modi have tried to normalize relations with Pakistan. Vajpayee’s Lahore bus journey in 1999 was met with the betrayal of the Kargil War. Modi’s surprise visit to Lahore in 2015 to attend then-Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s family wedding was followed within weeks by the Pathankot airbase attack. Such incidents demonstrate that in Pakistan, even when its civilian leadership is inclined toward peace, it lacks control over the military and intelligence agencies that operate with their own parallel agendas.
This civil-military imbalance is one of the core reasons why Pakistan struggles to be a trustworthy neighbour. The military, rather than being a state institution under democratic civilian command, functions as the ultimate power centre. It dictates foreign policy, especially towards India and Afghanistan and thrives on maintaining a narrative of external threats to justify its disproportionate share of the national budget and its influence over domestic politics. As long as the Pakistani military views India not as a potential partner but as an existential threat, any lasting peace remains a pipe dream.
Moreover, the export of terrorism and extremism is not limited to India. Afghanistan has long accused Pakistan of harbouring and supporting the Taliban a fact now undeniable after the Taliban’s return to power in Kabul in 2021. For decades, the Afghan Taliban leadership found safe havens in Pakistani cities like Quetta and Peshawar. The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, an offshoot with anti-Pakistan motives, emerged as a blowback of Islamabad’s own policies. Yet, even after paying the price domestically with hundreds of attacks and thousands of civilian and military casualties, Pakistan has not abandoned its strategy of using non-state actors as strategic assets in regional geopolitics.
This duplicity in behaviour playing both arsonist and firefighter has earned Pakistan the mistrust of its neighbours and the international community. Its claims of being a victim of terrorism ring hollow when the country refuses to dismantle the terror infrastructure on its soil or bring known terrorists to justice. Individuals like Hafiz Saeed and Masood Azhar have operated freely for years despite being listed as global terrorists by the United Nations. Pakistan has been repeatedly placed on the Financial Action Task Force grey list due to its failure to crack down on terror financing.
Beyond terrorism, Pakistan’s inability to be a good neighbour also stems from its domestic ideological orientation. In the decades following independence, the country drifted from secular beginnings towards religious radicalism. General Zia-ul-Haq’s era in the 1980s saw the Islamization of Pakistan’s laws, educational institutions and even its foreign policy approach. This ideological tilt has fuelled intolerance at home and mistrust abroad. It has created a national psyche that often views religious minorities and neighbouring countries particularly non-Muslim-majority ones with suspicion. This mindset makes it difficult for Pakistan to foster genuine people-to-people ties, academic exchange and cross-border business with neighbours like India.
Economically, Pakistan has also failed to create interdependence with its neighbours a key aspect of maintaining peaceful relations. Trade between India and Pakistan remains abysmally low due to frequent political standoffs. Even when trade routes are opened, they are often suspended abruptly due to tensions. Unlike regions such as Southeast Asia, where economic cooperation has brought erstwhile rivals closer, South Asia remains hostage to Pakistan’s reluctance to separate politics from commerce. By cutting off trade ties or making them contingent on the Kashmir issue, Pakistan forfeits opportunities that could improve the lives of its own citizens and build mutual trust.
Internal instability further compounds the problem. With multiple ethnic insurgencies, sectarian violence, political upheavals and a failing economy, Pakistan often lacks the bandwidth to engage with neighbours constructively. Its political leaders are frequently preoccupied with surviving power struggles rather than formulating long-term foreign policy. The civilian government’s ability to shape regional relationships is severely curtailed by the overarching dominance of the army, which sees hostility, not harmony, as a strategic asset. Furthermore, growing Chinese influence via the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor has aligned Pakistan’s regional priorities more with Beijing than with South Asian peace and integration.
The issue of Kashmir remains the biggest flashpoint and a major roadblock to any normalization. Pakistan’s obsession with Kashmir is not rooted solely in the cause of self-determination for Kashmiris but also in a deeper strategic and ideological fixation. Rather than allowing the Kashmir issue to evolve diplomatically or through bilateral engagement, Pakistan has internationalized the issue relentlessly, often by painting a distorted picture at global forums. It has consistently tried to portray India as an oppressor while ignoring the terrorism emanating from its own soil. Such one-sided narratives and refusal to recognize India’s sovereign concerns prevent meaningful dialogue.
On the rare occasions when peace seems possible, spoilers within Pakistan’s own system whether hardline clerics, military hawks or radical groups sabotage progress. Track-II diplomacy, cricket diplomacy or even cultural exchanges have been scuttled by incidents of terror or political rhetoric. Public opinion in Pakistan is also shaped by decades of propaganda, making it difficult for any leader to openly pursue peace without facing backlash. This entrenched hostility, kept alive through media and textbooks, creates a generation that sees neighbouring countries as enemies rather than partners.
In contrast, other South Asian nations like Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Bhutan and Nepal have steadily tried to foster peace, engage in regional cooperation and work towards common development goals. Bangladesh, which had every reason to remain bitter with Pakistan after 1971, has taken strides in becoming a stable and prosperous nation. Pakistan, meanwhile, remains stuck in a loop of denial, confrontation and regression.
The path to being a good neighbour requires introspection, reforms and a genuine shift in foreign and domestic policy. It involves giving up the use of terrorism as a foreign policy tool, accepting the sovereignty of neighbours, building economic and cultural bridges, and empowering civilian leadership. As things stand today, Pakistan shows little sign of making these changes. Its policies continue to be defined by strategic paranoia, ideological rigidity, and a lack of accountability.
Until Pakistan undergoes a fundamental transformation in how it views its neighbours not as threats but as partners it cannot claim the moral or political high ground. Being a good neighbour requires trust, consistency and goodwill. Sadly, in the case of Pakistan, these virtues remain in short supply
