Bilal Qureshi
The recent Counter Terrorism operations in Anantnag has again brought to forefront the Pakistan sponsored terrorist group The Resistance Force or, TRF. The terrorist group has been claiming victory over the tragic death of Indian Army and JKP personnel during the ongoing encounter. A careful analysis of the genesis of this terrorist group brings out the nefarious design of the Pakistan’s ISI to foment unrest in J&K.
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How TRF Came Into Being
At the global stage Pakistan is viewed as the epitome of terrorism hub. It was because of its active support to various terrorist organisations in South & West Asia region that Pakistan was placed for the first time on the grey list of FATF in 2008. Since, then it has been on and off the grey list. Through grey listing FATF had placed tremendous pressure on Pakistan to come clean on terror funding. The first major jostle came to Pakistan on 8 March 2019, when FATF went onto describe Daesh, Al Qaeda, Jamaat ud Dawa (JuD), Falah-i-Insaniat Foundation, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), Haqqani Network and persons affiliated with the Taliban as High-Risk entities. FATF gave Pakistan government ultimatum to take concrete actions against these terror outfits or continue to be on grey list. Being on the grey list for almost a decade had already taken a toll on Pakistan’s economy and hence, it could not have afforded to continue to be seen aiding LeT and other terrorist groups. Hence, to mask the funding and support, the Pakistani machinery needed a front.
The opportunity finally came in Aug 2019 when India declared abrogation of Article 370 which granted special status to J&K. It was at this moment that TRF came into existence as an online entity masking itself as indigenous movement. Subsequently, with active collaboration of Pakistan Army and ISI, various terrorists from LeT and other groups were amalgamated under TRF.
TRF has claimed that terrorist incident in the forested area of Kokernag was their retaliation against the killing of Muhammad Riyaz. Muhammad Riyaz alias Abu Qasim Kashmiri happened to be a LeT commander who was shot dead by unidentified gunmen a week ago in Rawalkot, POJK. The statement by the TRF itself prove their allegiance to LeT.
Pakistan’s Army In Collaboration With ISI Nurturing Proxy Terrorist Group Against India
In 2019, apart from TRF another proxy terrorist group named as People’s Anti Fascist Front (PAFF) also came into existence as proxy of JeM. PAFF is the same terrorist group which had claimed the responsible for twin terror attacks on Indian Army in Poonch & Rajouri on 20 Apr and 5 May respectively. Apart from TRF & PAFF there are few more such proxy terrorist tanzeems that has been created through collaboration of Pakistan’s Army & ISI, such as Kashmir Freedom Fighters (KFF) and J&K Gaznavi Force (JKGF). A careful analysis of these proxy groups reveals following :-
Motive.All of these proxy groups were created with an aim to mask the funding and support to the terrorist groups against India while at the same time evade scrutiny of anti terror funding organisations such as FATF. There has been a concerted effort to project terrorism as political struggle with flavour of indeginous resistance and freedom movement.
Naming Conventions.These proxy terror groups have been given religious neutral name to give it an indigenous hue which may gain greater acceptance to Western world.
Use of Social Media.All these proxy terror groups have made their affiliated Social Media accounts which they use to spread their propaganda and lay claim to any terrorist incidents. These social media accounts are extensively used to propagate anti India establishment agenda and threaten non-locals/ political workers/ security force sympathisers. Additionally, development works/ projects under progress/ proposed by the government were projected in negative parlance and against the local populace of J&K. The propaganda disseminated through these proxies is likely to be centrally controlled through institutionalised support from Pakistan’s int agency ISI. Last year more than 56 threats were recorded to have been released by proxy groups. Maximum No of threats were against alleged demographic alteration of Kashmir valley & rehabilitation of Kashmiri Pandits. These were followed by threats to civilians working for Security Forces, journalists covering pro-government narrative, JKP personnel and migrants/ non-locals working in J&K.
Claiming of Terrorist Actions.These proxy tanzeems have been prompt in claiming terrorist incidents. While, initially there used to instances of multiple proxies claiming for an incident, now the process seems to have been streamlined where a terrorist action is exclusively claimed by a particular proxy group. These proxies have been using heavily edited graphics of the terror incidents alongwith multimedia special effects to embellish their actions on various Social Media and conventional media platforms.
Finance & Support.The proxy tanzeems continue to draw its support and finances through their respective affiliated parent tanzeems. However, given the severe economic crisis in Pakistan and strong vigil along the borders by Indian Armed Forces, the fundings of these terrorist groups has taken a significant hit in past few years.
Psychological Warfare Being Played By These Proxies.
These proxy terrorist groups are involved in conducting psychological operations at the behest of their Pakistani intelligence handlers. They use it to influence the youth of J&K to join their ranks. A classic example of the same were unveiled during the Kokernag incident.
Propaganda.TRF had laid successful ambush in Kokernag.
Fact.Based on specific int input the operation was launched by IA & JKP on the night of 12/13 Sep. A cordon was established and a detailed search of the Garol village was conducted. Based on further leads, obtained during the search, it was ascertained that the terrorists were in a hideout in higher reaches above the village which was covered with dense foliage and undergrowth. Given the difficult terrain and lack of clear field of view, search was temporarily halted at night and resumed next day in daylight. The multiple search columns to the higher reaches were being led from the front by Col Manpreet Singh, SM alongwith the company commander and DySP. The columns had to move through re-entrants and rugged terrain with dense foliage and undergrowth. Such terrain provided natural cover to terrorists from ground and aerial observation also, they were hiding in pre-prepared hideouts. Being located in upper reaches had given the terrorist an additional advantage over the searching columns. On 13 Sep at approx. 1230 h the columns came under heavy fire. The search column retaliated but in the ensuing fire fight Col Singh, Maj Dhonchak & DSP Humayun suffered gunshot wounds and later succumbed to the injury.
Careful analysis of timelines of the operation reveals the following:-
The operations were started on the night of 12/13 Sep but, there was NO claim from TRF/ LeT initially.
As soon as the news of causalities suffered by the Indian Army and JKP during the operation came out in media around 1400 h on 13 Sep the affiliated Social Media handles of TRF/ LeT started claiming responsibility for the “Surprise Counter Attack”.
Then at around 1500 h on 13 Sep as the reports of serious injury of the DySP, SOG, CO & Major of the RR unit started coming out, these handles started propagating the narrative of “Planned Ambush Attack” to avenge killing of Mohammad Riyaz at Rawalkot.
Soon the media channels and social media was buzzing with these “Ambush Hypothesis”.
On 14 Sep as soon as Social Media started buzzing with messages asking answers from the government regarding the terrorist attack. The TRF handles started propagating their anti-establishment agenda targeting Lt Governor of J&K and DG JKP.
By the morning of 15 Sep, TRF handles started drawing parallel between the Kokernag Incident and Handwara Attack of 2020 in which significant causalities were suffered by IA & JKP.
IA had already pushed in various resources for reconnaissance in the area and had home on to the hideout locations. They started bombing these hideouts with high calibre weapons and armed quadcopters. By 1500 h on 15 Sep, TRF handles started propagating false narrative that all the terrorists involved in the incidents including LeT Commander Uzair Khan to have successfully exfiltrated from the site of encounter and reached safe point. However, as IA continued targeting these hideouts soon thereafter came another statement from TRF handles warning Security Forces from using armed quadcopters against their fighters.
15 Sep in the evening ADGP Kashmir in his press brief and subsequently on its official social media handles called for retired Police and Army Officers to avoid propagating the “Ambush Hypothesis”. He categorically specified that it was input based operations.
The problem with “Ambush Hypothesis” is that it gives undue credit to the terrorist group of being able to carry out successful attack on Security Forces. While, in reality it was the difficult forested terrain coupled with sheer chance that Security Forces suffered these causalities. What need to be understood that any live encounter in a densely forested terrain such as Kokernag carry very high probability of risks to lives of the Security Forces operators. Such scenario often requires the commander to be located closer to the area of action to have better access and control of the operations. Also, it is within the finest tradition and training of the Indian Army to have commanders leading their troops NO matter how dire the circumstances might be.
Imagine yourself walking through dense foliage unable to see ahead. While this foliage significantly restricts your view it doesnot provide any protection from bullets. The first volley of fire from an entrenched and hidden enemy has highest probability to kill. Modern day surveillance equipment may not always be very successful to detect hideouts in such terrain.
